THIS volume is an outcome of a conference organized in 2002 under the aegis of the World Bank, with a group of highly eminent contributors from the disciplines of economics, anthropology, sociology and political science. More than the sheer eminence of the contributors what makes the review of this volume daunting is the enormous complexity of the subject matter: culture and its interactions with public action, a terrain so multi-layered and multi-faceted that, prima facie, it appears that no generalizations would be possible. But it is precisely the amorphous nature of the subject matter that led one to accept the book for review. One was curious to see what this volume represented – was it simply a collection of different perspectives of well-known scholars on the issue or did it outline the agenda of the World Bank in the realm of culture, something that hitherto has been completely outside its purview? If the latter, then things got even ‘curiouser’, since the amorphous and ambiguous nature of the subject matter would represent the complete opposite of the certainty that characterizes the Bank’s perspective on economic matters. By certainty we mean that the Bank is certain of the tenets of its economic ideology; whether its position is accurate or appropriate is another matter.

Summing up the volume in one sentence, it is impressive in that it manages to capture the complexity of the subject matter in a fairly exhaustive manner without falling prey to stereotypical cultural determinism. The credit for that goes entirely to the editors for not only putting together a team of scholars who have managed to bring out the nuances underlying this highly complicated interaction, but also for providing a detailed perspective that is outlined in their opening and concluding remarks. Whether one agrees or disagrees with a given position, there is enough food for thought here for those who believe that culture is either ignored by economic policy-makers or treated in a dismissive fashion as an impediment to development: culture as representing the past as opposed to development as representing the future. The essays in this volume clearly highlight that culture and development are not dichotomous issues; that public action has to be both culturally informed and culture-enhancing and that both public policy and culture have several layers of meaning of which only some get predominance. In doing so, several of the essays investigate which meanings predominate in a given context and why.

Often when culture does enter the public discourse it comes disguised as cultural determinism of one sort or another. The neo-liberal economic agenda is known for its narrow and ahistorical vision of economic development that sees ‘getting prices right’ as a miracle cure to all problems of development. However, in most cases, the presumed benefits of this approach (i.e. high economic growth, smoothly functioning markets) do not materialize, but all the costs do (increasing inequality, high social costs associated with cut backs in public expenditure and so on). Instead of recognizing the intrinsic contradictions in this approach that condemn it to failure, the favourite explanation of neo-liberal economists is to blame the poor cultural traits of developing societies: a corrupt culture, the lack of a work ethic, inability to be disciplined and so forth. Paul Collier of Oxford, once Director of the Development Research Group at the Bank, offended a number of African and other NGOs to the point that he felt obliged to send an apology to the Director of the Third World Network. He was making the point that Africa itself is to blame for its own marginalisation and that this holds true more generally for all developing countries. The assumption, of course, was that the IMF and the World Bank did not have a role in shaping policies across the developing world.

Another area where cultural determinism creeps in is in discussions of inter-group disparities, whether race, caste or gender based. When certain groups are systematically found to have poor socio-economic outcomes, there is a tendency to blame the poor cultural attributes of these groups as responsible for their state (eugenics being the extreme expression of this belief), rather than recognizing the systemic social inequities that relegate these groups to the bottom of their respective societies. In both these cases the cultural (deterministic) explanation is taken to be self-evident, whereas its counter is very difficult to establish. And why this matters is because public policy is shaped by the dominant explanation of cultural determinism.

Amartya Sen’s paper provides a good critique of cultural determinism and stereotyping by discussing not whether culture matters, but how it does. He discusses with examples how certain stereotypes (prejudicial to groups or nations) get formed, but can also be reversed when economic circumstances of those groups or nations change. He cautions against ‘jumping from the frying pan of neglecting culture into the fire of crude cultural determinism’, a tendency that cannot be overemphasized with the predominance of the clash of civilizations thesis. Arjun Appadurai poses the central question of how cultural recognition can be extended to enhance redistribution. The suggestion is that along with resources, the ‘capacity to aspire’ is also unevenly distributed in a society and this needs to be corrected. He uses the example of a grassroots network in Mumbai that he believes exemplifies ‘what happens when a group of poor people begins to mobilize its capacity to aspire in a specific political and cultural regime.’ He goes on to suggest that lenders and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank ought to focus on the fortification of the capacity to aspire and need to ‘develop a set of tools for identifying the cultural map of aspirations that surround the specific intervention that is contemplated.’

This is important as it calls attention to another big strength of the volume: it does not try to peddle a set of pre-conceived ideas but shows, instead, a variety of perspectives that suggest how agencies such as the World Bank ought to act. The point that Appadurai makes is vital; whether it will be incorporated into any of the Bank’s thinking is a moot point. As the editors in their concluding comments point out: ‘Culturally informed public action is not easy. The process requires paying close attention to context in shaping interventions both globally and locally. It therefore argues against the idea of a “best practice” – that an intervention that worked wonders in one context would do the same in another… A cultural lens thus teaches us that public action, particularly when it is participatory, aspiration building, and aware of common sense, requires an element of experimentation and learning. Ironically, the best practice may be the recognition of the absence of a best practice.’

This is not only a challenging prescription but is in direct contradiction with the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Similarly, consider the following: ‘the recognition that societies consist of different groups, often structured in hierarchies with unequal social and cultural capital, suggests that mechanisms of intergroup exchange and deliberation need to be set up in a manner that changes the terms of recognition.’

Again, this is a welcome but tricky prescription for both external agents as well as national governments, since altering the terms of recognition would require a 180-degree change in mainstream thinking. This change could indeed be taken to its logical conclusion to allow for truly radical shifts in policies of national governments and external agents, but such a radical shift would hardly find favour either with individual nation states or with multilateral agencies, hesitant as they are to disturb the status quo.

This is where one realizes the limits of defining public action in economic terms alone, even though the most obvious manifestation of deprivation or poverty is economic. As the essays by Mary Douglas, Anita Abraham and Jean-Phillippe Platteau, Monica Das Gupta et al, Carol Jenkins; Simon Harragin, and Shelton Davis point out, the issue is equally political. Specifically, the role of the state (for instance in reducing gender inequality) and that of political movements (such as the Mayan movement in Guatemala) is intrinsic to the definition of a culturally sensitive public action programme. As the discussion of the reduction of gender inequality in China under socialist rule suggests, being culturally sensitive need not mean an endorsement of regressive practices. The state can recognize the blatant inequality embedded in local cultures and can promulgate radical public action to reverse such inequalities and to empower, say women (for instance, by changing laws on property ownership, on gender discrimination, and on divorce).

Timur Kuran strikes a controversial note in his essay, ‘Cultural obstacles to economic development: Often overstated, usually transitory’. Using his previously developed analytical apparatus of ‘preference falsification’, the perceived pay-offs of a given cultural trait may be clouded by political rhetoric and by social pressures that discourage honest expression. He discounts claims of cultural activists on the grounds that these individuals often come from elite sections and are thus likely to misrepresent the desires of the masses. While admitting that situations are more complex than the examples he gives, he often poses a dichotomy between material progress via globalization on the one hand, and the preservation of local cultures on the other. First, this assumes that the current wave of globalization will necessarily ensure material progress and that material progress is not possible in any other way. Second, that destruction of local cultures may not be a bad thing, protests by cultural activists notwithstanding. He gives examples of retrograde local practices, such as caste or gender discrimination in India, without stating that the cultural elite, when opposing the homogenizing effects of globalization, rarely ever do so on grounds that these retrograde practices will vanish. The protest over globalization and its cultural impact is because of the uniform, homogenized culture that globalization imposes, could be equally conservative or undesirable (non-welfare enhancing), albeit in its own way. For instance, just as caste discrimination is regressive and must go, it is not clear why a preference for McDonald’s, Starbucks, MTV and Nike (that the current wave of globalization will necessarily bring in its wake) ought to be desired as progressive or beneficial.

Also, there are uncomfortable questions that a simple equation of ‘local with regressive’ and ‘global with progressive’ would not be able to answer. For instance, when the Taliban demolishes ancient Buddha statues in Afghanistan, it is easy to condemn that as the vandalism symbolic of retrograde religious fundamentalism. But when American forces in Iraq torture war prisoners or fail to protect ancient manuscripts in the libraries of Baghdad, what does that represent? These are equally heinous and despicable acts perpetrated by the so-called champions of global liberty and progress. Also, a simplistic equation goes against the grain of this volume, which repeatedly cautions us that there is no uniform formula for culturally sensitive (that need not mean regressive) public action.

On the whole, this volume is a serious collection of thought-provoking essays that represent a welcome addition to the literature. They are refreshing since they do not try to peddle a set of platitudes but simply pose issues before the reader in all their complexity. Thus, they are a far cry from the Collier-style multi-country regression studies whose analytical worth is dubious. However, in posing complexities, none of the essays lack focus; thus they are not a stray collection of random thoughts either. That the volume has managed to achieve a fine balance between nuance and focus is no mean feat. Whether and to what extent this thinking will find its way into altering the World Bank’s prescriptions, only time can tell.

Ashwini Deshpande